urope's role in the Portuguese democratisation process has been analysed primarily by political science, following the line of research developed by «transitology», which highlighted the importance of the international context 1 and gained added momentum after the fall of the Socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. This literature divides democratisation processes into two phases: transition and consolidation. A key aspect that stands out is the idea that the EEC played a particularly relevant role in the democratic consolidation phase following Portugal's entry into the Community. However, Geoffrey Pridham argued that we should not overlook «the influences of European integration prior to membership» on «democ-ratisation or even transition», and he drew attention to the various kinds of influence that integration can exert over democratisation processes 2 . The present article will follow this line, taking a historical approach in the analysis of the evolution of the Portuguese Socialists in relation to the European integration project and Europe's role in the democratic transition phase. It spans the period from the fall of the authoritarian regime to the summer of 1976, following the adoption of the Constitution; during this time legislative elections took place, the President of the Republic was elected by direct ballot and the I Constitutional Government took office. Combining a set of internal and external factors, our aim is to analyse how the revolutionary process ultimately favoured a rapprochement. At first, this had seemed to A B S T R A C T T he role played by Europe in the Portuguese democratisation process has been analysed primarily by political science, following the line of research developed by «transitology» that drew attention to the importance of the international context. Among the key aspects that stand out in this literature is the idea that the EEC played a particularly relevant role in the democratic consolidation phase. However, Geoffrey Pridham argued that we should not overlook the influence of European integration on democratic transition processes. The present article will follow this line taking a historical approach by analysing the evolution of the Portuguese Socialists in relation to the process of European integration and the EEC's role during Portugal's democratic transition.
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R E S U M O
Socialismo, Europa e Democracia. Transição e integração europeia: O caso portugûes. have little chance of success and even its greatest advocates claimed it would be a long slow process that would be brought to fruition only in the long term.
THE 1972 TRADE AGREEMENT
From the 1960s, and notably under Marcelo Caetano's leadership, the non-Communist opposition and in particular the Socialists from ASP, (that would later form the PS), drew attention to the dilemma the country would ultimately have to face: Africa or Europe. However, this dilemma did not separate just the opponents and supporters of the regime. It very quickly became clear that there were also conflicting positions within the Estado Novo, and even among its most powerful support base (Church, armed forces, large economic groups). While some sectors of the opposition believed that Africa meant perpetuating the dictatorship and that Europe was synonymous with democracy, there were some in the regime who thought there was scope to play both sides simultaneously, and others who saw rapprochement to Europe as the first step towards the future political liberalisation of the dictatorship. Indeed, the latter position was shared by members of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany who advocated that involving Portugal more in the integration process would strengthen the liberal elements of the Lisbon regime 3 . But for the Portuguese head of government, the Europe-Africa binomial was a false dilemma because Portugal was simultaneously African and European and it could never renounce this twofold trait 4 . Nevertheless, the signature of a free trade agreement between Portugal and the European Economic Community in July 1972 was not seen by the opposition as a purely diplomatic manoeuvre in response to the need to protect itself from any negative impact on the national economy resulting from the United Kingdom's entry in the EEC, or as a mere response to the evolution in the EFTA/EEC relations. It was an understandable fear that the first steps were being taken towards a rapprochement that was not just economic, but with clear political repercussions. In fact, the agreement contained an evolutionary clause that opened the path to the development and deepening of the relations between the two parties. Fifteen months before this agreement was signed, Mário Soares, one of the most important members of the opposition and leader of the Portuguese Socialists, did not believe Marcelo Caetano would be able to bring about this rapprochement without previously promoting internal reforms in exchange; for example, making the national production structures more competitive, putting an end to corporativism, and permitting freedom O papel da Europa no processo de democratização português tem vindo a ser essencialmente analisado pela ciência política seguindo a linha de investigação desenvolvida pela transitology que chamou a atenção para a importância do contexto internacional. Entre os aspectos sublinhados por esta literatura destaca-se a ideia de que o papel da CEE é relevante na fase da consolidação democrática. Geoffrey Pridham defendeu, no entanto, que não devemos negligenciar a influência da integração europeia nos processos de transição. Adoptando uma abordagem histórica, este artigo pretende seguir essa linha, analisando a evolução dos socialistas portugueses em relação ao projecto de integração europeia e o papel da Europa na fase da transição democrática.
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Transição democrá-tica; Integração Europeia; Portugal; Partido Socialista. of association once again. When there was no longer any doubt that the agreement would be reached, Soares began to play down its importance and minimise its political significance 5 . However, the agreement did have some political significance and there were other signs that worried the opposition. At the XII International Socialist Congress at the end of June 1972, the representative of the Portuguese Socialists appealed to their international partners to oppose the Portuguese government's participation in the European Security Conference 6 ; and later, when it was revealed that Lisbon had managed to buy a range of military equipment from the French government, the Portuguese Socialists were afraid that Marcelo Caetano's government was managing to consolidate itself 7 . Another sector of the opposition shared these fears. In December 1973, Francisco Sá Carneiro, the Liberal wing dissident, wrote an article for the «Expresso» that was censored: «It seems the Common Market is designing a parallel evolution through a strange extension of the concept of democracy and freedom, which will lead to its opening the doors to Mediterranean authoritarianism» 8 . Any development of the kind would clearly imply finding a political solution to the colonial problem. Marcelo Caetano tried this path, but the President of the Council was aware that any change in the empire would impact the life of the regime, just as any change in the regime would have repercussions for the survival of the empire. The ties keeping the regime and the empire united and in tact could not be undone without harming the two parties that gave it shape. It was this overlap that led to the impasse and to the end of the Liberal wing's hopes. The 1972 agreement did not strengthen the position of the pro-Europeans vis-à-vis the intergrationsists, as the Portuguese negotiators defended, nor did it contribute to the political liberalisation of the regime, essentially because it did not give rise to a political solution to the war. Mário Soares was the member of the opposition with the clearest understanding of this impasse and he tried to make the most of its political dividends. The Socialist leader drew attention both at home and abroad to the divisions at the heart of the regime and highlighted Marcelo's inability to overcome them 9 . Meanwhile, the Socialist's were competing in a political arena increasingly threatened by the far-left, so its official discourse defended the need to deepen Portugal's ties with a Europe that did not exist: a «United Socialist Europe (...) at the service of the workers» and not «a creation of international employers», based on «neo-capitalist and imperialist foundations», facilitating «the penetration of American, European, and multinational capital in various Western European countries» 10 . Meanwhile, the Socialist leader took a more moderate stand when he was addressing international public opinion, defending that the future of Portugal involved European integration. However, this was not described as risk-or problem-free: «there is no other path without causing great sacrifices for the Portuguese people!»; and it should not be applied in the short term: «I consider integration as a target to be reached after a certain period of time» 11 . On the eve of the fall of the Estado Novo, Europe was not merely a pipe dream for the opposition, it was also a threat symbolised by a fashionable expression of the day: «Europe of the trusts»
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. The rapprochement between Portugal and Europe under Marcelo left its marks.
MILITARY COUP AND FALL OF THE REGIME
The Socialists were not the only ones to see the rapprochement and stronger ties with the Common Market, the then expression for the EEC, as a gradual process that should be implemented over time. Already after the fall of the regime, in the aftermath of a trip to Brussels in September 1974, the Secretary General of PPD, Francisco Sá Carneiro, defended that the priority was to ensure full advantage was taken of the existing agreement and strengthening the evolutionary clause in the fields of economic and technical cooperation; he said that «Portugal's admission as a full member was still a long way off» 13 . However, Sá Carneiro strived to set himself apart from Mário Soares, stating at the end of October that year that his party gave a «clear yes to Europe and to the Europe of the Common Market»; he added that he did not consider this to be «a simple construction of monopolies in an advanced phase of capitalism». But, in fact, the PPD leader was unable to avoid the platitudes of the day in this same press conference. Like the Socialists, he defended «a Portuguese path to Socialism as an original contribution to the development and consolidation of social democracy in Europe and the world» and committed to establishing «a bridge between the construction of democratic socialism in Europe and the socialist experiences in the Third World»; this bridge would be «Portugal's contribution to an internationally responsible and anti-imperialist European socialism with under-developed countries» 14 . Given this manifest inability to mark out differences, it was not difficult for Soares to assert himself as Europe's main interlocutor as the revolutionary process gathered pace. Since the 1960s, the Socialist leader had been establishing a network with the European Socialist and Social Democratic parties. As a result of these contacts, the President of the Junta of National Salvation, General António de Spínola, invited him to travel to the main European cities so that Portugal's new political situation would gain international recognition. These contacts also opened the doors for him to the Palácio das Necessidades. From May 1974, in the dual role of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary General of PS, Soares hosted heads of Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, leaders of parties and trade unions in Lisbon and visited them in Europe. Initially, Soares and his interlocutors were concerned primarily with resolving the colonial problem. The question of deepening relations with the EEC was relegated to a secondary position 15 . It was the logical development of a strategy that been defended since the opposition to Marcelism. In addition, some political leaders, notably in the North of Europe, had expressed a wish to make economic aid programmes and closer relations with Portugal conditional upon its prior recognition of the colonies' right to self-determination and independence 16 .
On the other hand, neither the MFA Programme nor that of the first two provisional governments defended closer ties with the Common Market. The MFA Programme simply advocated broadening and diversifying «international relations based on friendship and cooperation» and the Programme of the I Provisional Government advocated the «intensification of trading and political relations with the countries of the European Economic Community» 17 and not with the European Economic Community. It was only seven months after the military coup that Lisbon presented proposals for the modification of some of the clauses in the 1972 free trade agreement and sought to improve the social rights of the Portuguese emigrants in the EEC countries 18 . Meanwhile, it was necessary to wait until 20 January 1976 for the EEC's Council of Ministers to authorise the Commission to negotiate with Portugal, and until the following 9 June to sign an additional protocol to the agreement and also a financial protocol. This impasse is explained by Portugal's turbulent internal situation.
THE INTERNAL CONTEXT
Over these two years, Portugal went through a process of political, economic and social upheavals. The fall of the I Provisional Government in July 1974; the tension between the President of the Republic and the Coordinating Commission of the MFA due to divergences on the future of the African territories; the events of 28 September and the resignation of Spínola; the deepening of the rift between Socialists and Communists; the rapid deterioration in the country's economic and financial situation; and the explosion in the world of work in the countryside and cities; this all intensified revolutionary dynamics that had little interest in deepening ties with the EEC. This is the context in which the evolution of the Portuguese Socialists should be analysed, a party that criticised European social democracy while systematically claiming to be the main defender of Portugal's integration in the European construction process which had been enjoying new momentum since late 1969
19 . It was not an easy path however. Internally, there were profound divergences on the subject in PS, and, in a party spectrum in formation, PPD sought to affirm itself as the main pro-Europe party. The PS Congress in Lisbon in December 1974 is very revealing of the internal contradictions within the party. Until then, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Socialist leader had only defended deepening the existing agreement, rejecting the possibility of advancing to member status, not to mention an integration agreement; this was due to the country's level of development and the negative effects the process would have on the Portuguese economy 20 . It was not a rejection of integration in the European project as such, but more a question of preparing for the struggle that the Portuguese economy would have to endure. This was however quite distinct from the position expressed in the party's Programme. Although revised at this meeting, it remained highly critical of the European construction process, described as a structure that guaranteed the worldwide domination of capitalism 21 . At the Congress, the group formed to fight the left wing headed by Manuel Serra defended prioritising the foreign policy of developing closer ties with Europe 22 . It was the appearance of this group, which was the butt of criticisms from the radical wing of the party, that allowed Soares to emerge as a leader able to act as a bridge between the various sensibilities of a divided party and made it possible to consolidate the line proposed by the leadership after Manuel Serra's split. Shortly after, Serra formed the Frente Socialista Popular (FSP -Popular Socialist Front), a party that ultimately came within the orbit of the PCP. The defeat of the radical wing, the weak impact of the subsequent split, and stopping the desertion of a significant group of social democratic supporters who threatened to move over to PPD 23 are important aspects not only in the history of PS, but also in the democratic transition and the European option which was thereafter envisaged as a future possibility. A PS dominated by supporters of non alignment and Third Worldism or deprived of Social Democratic sensibilities could never affirm itself as Europe's main interlocutor. In such a scenario, Sá Carneiro's PPD would find the door open first for its much-wanted membership of the International Socialists and then to become the main pro-Europe party. In this context, the European option would only have been considered by the parties in the centre and to the right of the political spectrum. Could this option have been successful under these circumstances? It is important to analyse how PS became the major Pro-European left wing party, despite the clear positioning defined in its programme and the constraints experienced during the PREC.
PS -PIVOTAL PARTY
The acceleration of the revolutionary dynamics that took place in the late summer of 1974 had a marked impact on PS. An important group advocated maintaining stronger ties with the PCP and left wing parties continuing to work as a unit as they had under the Estado Novo, that is, a hybrid model in which different parties coexisted but grouped under the MDP/CDE umbrella. However, the party's leaders and more central wing sought to clearly mark out the differences between PS and PC in light of the latter's well known hegemonic pretensions. This was essentially the struggle waging at the Congress in December 1974. Over the following months, the breach with MDP, the trade union question, the controversy around the lack of pluralism in the media and the debates on the participation of the armed forces in the Constituent Assembly contributed to accentuating the deep rift separating communists and socialists on all these matters. Meanwhile, the Socialist leaders continued to claim that their ultimate objective was to destroy capitalism and they attempted to keep an equal distance between Nordic social democracy and the model of the people's democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. It was only in an interview in the pro Social Democratic newspaper Le Novel Observateur at the end of February 1975 that Mário Soares confirmed that if he had to choose between «State capitalism with a Socialist façade», like that of the Soviet Union and the «so called people's democracy», and the Swedish Socialism, his choice went unreservedly to «Socialism the Swedish way», because although it was not «true Socialism», it had produced a more human and freer society than many others. Nonetheless, for Portugal he continued to defend the application of «a true Socialism and not just a capitalism with its most odious features corrected» 24 . In light of this stance, PPD tried to assert itself as the main interlocutor of Social Democracy in Portugal and, thus, the European preference. When Willy Brandt and Olof Palme visited Portugal in October 1974, PPD stressed the PS's ambiguity: on one hand, critical of the Social Democratic model but on the other seeking closer ties with the European Social Democratic parties. The description of Olof Palme's arrival at Lisbon airport is a good illustration of the situation at the time: members of PPD shouted slogans alluding to social democratic membership, while members of the young socialists handed out leaflets criticising social democracy 25 . Parallel to this, senior members of PPD were visiting European countries to muster support for their party's membership of the Socialist International 26 . In fact, the Socialists managed to remain the only Portuguese members of the Socialist International and, although PPD established contacts and obtained backing, notably financial support, they were unable to forge a special relationship with any of Europe's political families. CDS, on the other hand, rapidly became a part of the Christian democrat network. This weakness in conjunction with Sá Carneiro removal from the provisional governments, after the crisis that led to the fall of the Palma Carlos government, and with Mário Soares' success in the internal struggle waging in his party influenced the evolution of the political process in Portugal and the subsequent actions of external actors. As the revolutionary process gathered pace, PS and Mário Soares became the main advocates of the pluralist path and sought backing in Europe and the United States for the struggle waging internally. The revolutionary threat is thus the main cause for the transformation that took place in the Socialist Party, which abandoned the Third Worldist discourse and adopted a pro-European stance 27 . Despite the PS victory in the election for the Constituent Assembly, in May 1975 the revolutionary path gained new impetus and it became clear that only the moderate members of the armed forces on the Revolutionary Council could invert what seemed an overwhelming trend. The PS leader addressed the main political and military power and used economic arguments to justify the need for deepening ties with Europe. Soares explained to the members of the Revolutionary Council that the catastrophic economic situation required expansionist policies if they were to stem the country's growing unemployment. This entailed making investments and, given the deficit in the balance of payments, it was vital that there were no reductions in either revenues from the key tourism sector or emigrants' remittances. In fact, these two sources of foreign currency originated mainly from Europe. As a result, Soares argued that even though an approximation to Third World countries might be correct at a strictly political level, this would be of «little» value at the economic level and, therefore, Portugal should bet in Europe. On the other hand, the Socialist leader recalled that the country only had enough currency to guarantee its responsibilities until September that year and that part of the Bank of Portugal's gold was pledged as security in Switzerland, which raised the question: «when the reserves run out, who will give us a loan?» In his opinion, only Europe would do so but that meant the country had to guarantee political democracy was assured; only then would «Europe help». He predicted that «the fundamental aid must come from Europe. The strength of things will force us to review things». According to the Secretary General of PS, if the strikes continued, the occupations and the purges, the country would soon be facing economic and financial collapse and the counter revolution would be the main beneficiary of such a context 28 . Three days after this meeting, the Assembly of MFA discussed the future of «Portuguese Socialism» and reached the conclusion that the PS leadership should be stopped because it did not want Portugal to go beyond the stages of Socialism reached in Western Europe. The Assembly therefore recommended that CR adopted a «a firm and critical position towards the parties, namely the PS», which were creating obstacles that were preventing the unfolding of the revolutionary process 29 . Following this meeting of the MFA, a large demonstration was organised in Lisbon in defence of the people's power with the support of PCP, MDP and FSP. Addressing the crowds who were calling for the armed forces to have a stronger role in the political process, the head of the armed forces, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, referred to the National Anthem as the future National Anthem of the Socialist Republic of Portugal 30 .
THE EXTERNAL FACTOR
This was when the Socialist Secretary General warned some of the Western governors and senior EEC officials of the need to take measures, suggesting that the Soviet Union should be told of possible repercussions in the détente should the situation in Portugal deteriorate 31 . In the weeks that followed, the Portuguese Socialists pressured Western countries to spell it out to Moscow that advances along the revolutionary path would damage the détente process 32 .
The countries of Europe as well as the United States exerted this pressure in Helsinki and also on the President of the Republic, General Costa Gomes. In the latter case, the aim was to make Portugal's military and political leader aware that the country's economic situation was at breaking point, it could not rely on the USSR for any aid of that kind, and that bilateral or multilateral support was dependent upon the adoption of a democratic and multiparty solution that respected individual freedom 33 . Following the Helsinki meeting, the European countries had to take the initiative. This division should not be interpreted as a consequence of the previous divergences on the West's strategy on Portugal 34 . These had already been overcome. In mid-July, after the PS had left government, the United States ambassador in Lisbon met with his British and German colleagues: they all agreed with the strong position adopted by the Portuguese Socialists who they argued would have to turn their electoral strength into political strength and that it was important to build bridges with the MFA's moderate members of the armed forces. The representatives of West Germany and the United Kingdom also agreed with the North American ambassador who defended that it was time to act but that it was the Europeans who should take the lead 35 . Meeting in the outskirts of Stockholm, the main leaders of the Socialist and Social Democratic parties, including heads of state, ministers and party leaders of 12 European countries and of Israel, listened to Mário Soares as he painted a bleak picture of the situation in Portugal and they agreed on positions. Following the meeting, a small work group was formed, made up of Palme, Brandt, Mitterrand and Callaghan, the aim of which was to channel financial aid to the Portuguese Socialists. The Committee of Friendship and Solidarity for Democracy and Socialism in Portugal was set up in London. The approved strategy was based on four points: technical and financial support for PS; awareness raising activities in Portugal and West Europe; exchange programmes with the Portuguese Armed Forces; preparation of the EEC's economic aid programme 36 . Despite the apparent unanimity, there were some divergences among the European Socialists. For example, Harold Wilson and Mitterrand believed that the support plan for the Socialists should only be put into action once the political instability in Portugal had been overcome and a Communist dictatorship was no longer a possibility 37 . In this case, the position defended essentially by the Nordic countries prevailed, namely that it was necessary to act before the internal situation deteriorated seriously and a scheme was set in motion to allocate funds to the PS through a Swiss bank. A different position was adopted, however, on financial aid for Portugal. Here, the pro-active position defended by the Swedes was in the minority and it was decided at the London meeting that they should follow the EEC position, that is, that financial aid would only be released once certain democratic requirements, such as the holding of free elections and the subsequent constitution of a government, had been met. The Socialist leader, who publicly defended that aid from Europe should be unconditional, agreed on this condition 38 . Nonetheless, the EEC was not a mere spectator to the internal developments.
EUROPEAN ANTICIPATION
On 11 June 1975, the Commission defended in the Council that emergency economic and financial aid should be sent to Portugal, recommending that the aid should be provided «quickly and in a spectacular fashion» so as to have the maximum political effect. One week later, the Commissioner for External Relations, Christopher Soames, addressed the European Parliament, calling for immediate and substantial aid to be granted to Portugal as a demonstration of the Community's engagement in supporting Portugal on the path towards pluralist democracy. The following month, the French President vetoed the sending of community aid to Portugal and Europe's final communiqué of 16 and 17 July stated that the EEC was willing to cooperate more closely with Portugal on economic and financial matters but that this support would only be granted to a pluralist democratic State
39
. However, this proved to be a very broad concept. As a result of the internal and external pressure, President Costa Gomes decided to dismiss Vasco Gonçalves from his position as Prime Minister at the end of August. Forming the new executive was a long slow process however, indicative of the continued tensions in Portuguese political and military life. Over the next two weeks, the negotiations for the constitution of the VI provisional government were also subjected to external pressures. On one hand, the North American Secretary of State expressed his dissatisfaction with the continued presence of PCP militants in the government
40
; on the other, the Communist leader reported that the EEC had made the unblocking of financial aid for the country conditional upon the new Finance Minister not being a member of the Communist party 41 . On 19 September, the new government took office. Although Kissinger's wishes were not satisfied, largely because the Socialist leader wanted to maintain communists in the government for fear of losing influence in certain parts of the country, it was neither a PCP militant nor a compagnon de route that became Minister of Finance. The position went to Salgado Zenha, a well-known senior member of the Socialist Party. The much sought-after loan arrived less than a month later. Vasco Gonçalves' departure and the substitution of the V Government with one that reflected the results of the election for the Constituent Assembly were sufficient for the EEC's Council of Ministers to approve the concession of a large amount of emergency financial aid for Portugal. This change of attitude has been described as a natural development due to the political shift witnessed in Portugal. However, merely substituting one provisional government with another, also provisional, did not turn Portugal into a pluralist democratic regime, nor did it remove the possibility of armed action.
In fact, what happened was that the European Council changed its attitude and started following the Commission's directions. Thus, both the EEC and the United States, which publicised an aid package three days later, took an initiative even before the military clarification in November 1975, which benefited the moderates in the fight they were still waging against the supporters of the revolutionary path. The EEC did not expect the situation in Portugal to be clarified. On the contrary, it contributed to this clarification with the means at its disposal: the provision of financial resources at a reduced interest rate and manifesting its unequivocal commitment to the successful establishment of a pluralist democratic regime. Soon after, in January 1976, the EEC's Council of Ministers authorised the Commission to negotiate the revision of the 1972 Free Trade Act with Portugal.
EUROPE WITH THE PS AND THE PS WITH EUROPE
Portugal's rapprochement with the EEC and that of the EEC with Portugal is thus the fruit of the revolutionary process and it emerged in response to the revolutionary drift. The PS also played a fundamental role as the pivotal party in this context. Despite fears and doubts about Portugal joining the Communities, the events that took place in Portugal in 1974 and led to the anticipation and shortening of a process that was expected, but not so soon. The PS stood out in this area due to its demarcation in relation to the political parties to the left, the need for a counterpoint to the end of the imperial cycle and the competition with the parties to its right that defended Portugal's membership. The Third Worldist discourses and proposals were set aside, and Portugal's integration in the European project took the spotlight in the campaign for the first legislative elections that would take place on the second anniversary of the 25th April revolution. One month before the elections, the PS organised a meeting in Porto of the Committee for Friendship and Solidarity with Democracy and Socialism in Portugal. In the legislative elections of 1976, the PS was again the most voted party. Refusing alliances with the parties either to its left or to its right, the Socialists formed a minority government. Its programme defended the need to start a new phase in the relationship with the EEC and to open negotiations with a view to membership, which they estimated could be achieved in three years 44 . This was not a consensual choice. During the debate on the government programme in the Assembly of the Republic, only the CDS praised the initiative 45 . The leader of the PPD did not deny he wanted Portugal to be integrated in the EEC but argued that the negotiation process for membership would be so slow that it would be preferable to begin by negotiating associate status 46 ; Álvaro Cunhal spoke for the PCP and expressed his opposition to an integration that would «accentuate the ties of dependence and reduce the prospects of economic development and social progress» in the country 47 . Once Portugal's membership of the Council of Europe was guaranteed, Portuguese diplomacy, led by Medeiros Ferreira, established the first contacts with a view to submitting the application for membership that would be formalised in March 1977. It was the start of a process that proved much longer than the Portuguese authorities had initially expected.
CONCLUSION
The EEC played a relevant role during the democratic transition in Portugal. In the Portuguese case, we find examples of the five types of influence identified by Pridham (symbolic; the stimulating effects of the prospects of entry; conditionality instruments; the elites' involvement in the EU's institutional framework and in transnational networks with connections to the Community) 48 . PS took a central role in the dynamics established at the time. Due to the political situation at the time, the fact that the civil leadership of this process was a party known to have opposed the old regime and with strong international ties was of relevance to the defeat of the revolutionary path and to the success of the transition to democracy, just as the positioning of PS and the way the party evolved was not indifferent. The evolution of Europe's positioning on Portugal was also important. While it is true that «the pro-European shift was essentially a consequence of decolonisation and the institutionalisation of democracy» 49 , we can state that the PS's proEuropean shift and, to a lesser extent, the EEC's more interventionist position with regards Portugal even before the clarification of the military situation of 25th November 1975 contributed to the institutionalisation of democracy. The shape and timing of the European option is therefore, above all, the result of the fight between revolutionary legitimacy and democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the pragmatic dimension of this option. Under the Estado Novo, the rapprochement with Europe was presented not as an ideal but as a necessity, and it started to be defended during the transition due to economic and geographic constraints. Later, when already a Member State, participation in the Economic and Monetary Union was also justified as the best response to an inevitable external constraint rather than as a goal for the country 50 . Although almost four decades have already passed, these genetic features of Portugal's adhesion to the European construction project are still clearly present. Portugal (1974 Portugal ( -1976 
